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Lester Zick · Guest

If copy theory is an inadequate basis on which to explain how the mind
produces what appear to be copies of external phenomena - which I
agree that it is - I would like to ask the following question:

In the absence of copy theory how is it that some external sensation A
is processed or operated on by brain B so as to produce some C as a
non copy of A yet with the ability to operate on C to produce some
apparent copy of A?

There are really two parts to this question:

How does B operate on A to produce some C as a non copy of A?

Such that B can also operate on C to produce some apparently realistic
image of A?

Regards - Lester

remove DEL in address for email

Wolf Kirchmeir · Guest

On Thu, 28 Aug 2003 22:07:44 GMT, Lester Zick wrote:

[quote]The brain apparently does contain representations that model certain
aspects of reality, but models are not copies.

Well I>m not really sure. What ensures or prevents models from being
copies?
[/quote]
If you>ve ever made model airplanes, you should know the difference.

--
Best Wishes,
Wolf Kirchmeir, Blind River ON
"Not that brains are everything --
you>ll also need a skull to put them in." (Nancy Franklin, 1997)
<just one w and plain ca for correct address>

Joe Legris · Guest

Lester Zick wrote:
[quote]If copy theory is an inadequate basis on which to explain how the mind
produces what appear to be copies of external phenomena - which I
agree that it is - I would like to ask the following question:

In the absence of copy theory how is it that some external sensation A
is processed or operated on by brain B so as to produce some C as a
non copy of A yet with the ability to operate on C to produce some
apparent copy of A?

There are really two parts to this question:

How does B operate on A to produce some C as a non copy of A?

Such that B can also operate on C to produce some apparently realistic
image of A?

Regards - Lester

remove DEL in address for email

[/quote]
"Copy theory" is a straw-man. The only reference I can find to such a
thing is here:

Chander, M.J., & Boyes M. (1982). Social Cognitive Development. In B. B.
Wolman (Ed), Handbook of developmental psychology (pp. 387-402).
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

As they describe it, a child>s (age 2-3) ability to judge the contents
of other people>s minds is likened to a recording device that copies the
world without interpretation. Because of this young children fail the
false belief task, where they are incapable of conceiving that someone
else may believe something that they know is false.

This has nothing to do with the general nature of consciousness and the
perception of reality. No one seriously believes that the brain contains
a copy of reality.

The brain apparently does contain representations that model certain
aspects of reality, but models are not copies.

When the brain (B) operates on sensed external variables (A) to produce
a model (C), it uses information and internal structures developed over
the life and phylogenic history of the organism. Presumably, the brain
has a reentrant structure (i.e. internal feedback) so that the resulting
model can also be taken as another input variable.

All perception is the result of brain processes. If some perceptions
appear more "realistic" than others I would expect that the perceiver
has had some practice making such discriminations and has found that
certain attributes, such as visual clarity, a sense of wakefulness, and
correspondence to intuitive physical properties of the world, have
generally led to satisfactory outcomes. Or at least realistic ones.

--
Joe Legris

Lester Zick · Guest

On Thu, 28 Aug 2003 17:37:56 -0400, Joe Legris <jalegris@xympatico.ca>
wrote:

[quote]Lester Zick wrote:
If copy theory is an inadequate basis on which to explain how the mind
produces what appear to be copies of external phenomena - which I
agree that it is - I would like to ask the following question:

In the absence of copy theory how is it that some external sensation A
is processed or operated on by brain B so as to produce some C as a
non copy of A yet with the ability to operate on C to produce some
apparent copy of A?

There are really two parts to this question:

How does B operate on A to produce some C as a non copy of A?

Such that B can also operate on C to produce some apparently realistic
image of A?

Regards - Lester

remove DEL in address for email

"Copy theory" is a straw-man. The only reference I can find to such a
thing is here:

Chander, M.J., & Boyes M. (1982). Social Cognitive Development. In B. B.
Wolman (Ed), Handbook of developmental psychology (pp. 387-402).
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

As they describe it, a child>s (age 2-3) ability to judge the contents
of other people>s minds is likened to a recording device that copies the
world without interpretation. Because of this young children fail the
false belief task, where they are incapable of conceiving that someone
else may believe something that they know is false.

This has nothing to do with the general nature of consciousness and the
perception of reality. No one seriously believes that the brain contains
a copy of reality.
[/quote]
I>m not so sure but I don>t think we>re dealing here with a critical
path. The Greeks may have conceived of consciousness in such terms.
I>m not really sure. But I think this may have formed a significant
theory of cognition at one time.
[quote]
The brain apparently does contain representations that model certain
aspects of reality, but models are not copies.
[/quote]
Well I>m not really sure. What ensures or prevents models from being
copies?
[quote]
When the brain (B) operates on sensed external variables (A) to produce
a model (C), it uses information and internal structures developed over
the life and phylogenic history of the organism. Presumably, the brain
has a reentrant structure (i.e. internal feedback) so that the resulting
model can also be taken as another input variable.

All perception is the result of brain processes. If some perceptions
appear more "realistic" than others I would expect that the perceiver
has had some practice making such discriminations and has found that
certain attributes, such as visual clarity, a sense of wakefulness, and
correspondence to intuitive physical properties of the world, have
generally led to satisfactory outcomes. Or at least realistic ones.

It isn>t the realism that defines the problem exactly. That>s just an[/quote]
ancillary consideration. I>m just curious how the brain processes A to
produce C such that it is not a mere copy of A.

You state and I agree that what the brain contains is not a copy of
reality. But it is less clear what the contents of the brain are if
not a copy of reality. I think this is really what I>m asking. What is
it that the brain does with A such that C is not a copy of A?

Regards - Lester

remove DEL in address for email

Glen M. Sizemore · Guest

Absolute nonsense, Joe. This is the hallmark of representationalism. In the
case of the "cognitive map" it is quite explicit, but it is usually only
thinly disguised. What the hell is the "prototype" theory for Chrissakes.
Honestly, Joe, it is not like you>re a drooling crack head, but sometimes
you say the......well......dumbest things.

"Joe Legris" <jalegris@xympatico.ca> wrote in message
news:3F4E7634.6010006@xympatico.ca...
[quote]Lester Zick wrote:
If copy theory is an inadequate basis on which to explain how the mind
produces what appear to be copies of external phenomena - which I
agree that it is - I would like to ask the following question:

In the absence of copy theory how is it that some external sensation A
is processed or operated on by brain B so as to produce some C as a
non copy of A yet with the ability to operate on C to produce some
apparent copy of A?

There are really two parts to this question:

How does B operate on A to produce some C as a non copy of A?

Such that B can also operate on C to produce some apparently realistic
image of A?

Regards - Lester

remove DEL in address for email

"Copy theory" is a straw-man. The only reference I can find to such a
thing is here:

Chander, M.J., & Boyes M. (1982). Social Cognitive Development. In B. B.
Wolman (Ed), Handbook of developmental psychology (pp. 387-402).
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

As they describe it, a child>s (age 2-3) ability to judge the contents
of other people>s minds is likened to a recording device that copies the
world without interpretation. Because of this young children fail the
false belief task, where they are incapable of conceiving that someone
else may believe something that they know is false.

This has nothing to do with the general nature of consciousness and the
perception of reality. No one seriously believes that the brain contains
a copy of reality.

The brain apparently does contain representations that model certain
aspects of reality, but models are not copies.

When the brain (B) operates on sensed external variables (A) to produce
a model (C), it uses information and internal structures developed over
the life and phylogenic history of the organism. Presumably, the brain
has a reentrant structure (i.e. internal feedback) so that the resulting
model can also be taken as another input variable.

All perception is the result of brain processes. If some perceptions
appear more "realistic" than others I would expect that the perceiver
has had some practice making such discriminations and has found that
certain attributes, such as visual clarity, a sense of wakefulness, and
correspondence to intuitive physical properties of the world, have
generally led to satisfactory outcomes. Or at least realistic ones.

--
Joe Legris
[/quote]

Lester Zick · Guest

On Thu, 28 Aug 2003 19:58:46 -0400 (EDT), "Wolf Kirchmeir"
<wwolfkir@sympatico.can> wrote:

[quote]On Thu, 28 Aug 2003 22:07:44 GMT, Lester Zick wrote:

The brain apparently does contain representations that model certain
aspects of reality, but models are not copies.

Well I>m not really sure. What ensures or prevents models from being
copies?

If you>ve ever made model airplanes, you should know the difference.

[/quote]
Except that a model airplane is a copy of the real thing. A scaled
copy perhaps but a copy nonetheless. Same with model railroads. In
order not to be a copy there has to be some categorical difference
involved that does not merely represent a percentage of the original
sensation.

The fact that the toy models you describe use different materials is
not really relevant. We can assume some change in material between
sensation A and brain output C. But if all we>re left with is a copy
of the original with some change in material substrate, we are still
left with a copy.

Regards - Lester

remove DEL in address for email

Joe Legris · Guest

Glen M. Sizemore wrote:
[quote]
"Joe Legris" <jalegris@xympatico.ca> wrote in message
news:3F4E7634.6010006@xympatico.ca...

Lester Zick wrote:

If copy theory is an inadequate basis on which to explain how the mind
produces what appear to be copies of external phenomena - which I
agree that it is - I would like to ask the following question:

In the absence of copy theory how is it that some external sensation A
is processed or operated on by brain B so as to produce some C as a
non copy of A yet with the ability to operate on C to produce some
apparent copy of A?

There are really two parts to this question:

How does B operate on A to produce some C as a non copy of A?

Such that B can also operate on C to produce some apparently realistic
image of A?

Regards - Lester

"Copy theory" is a straw-man. The only reference I can find to such a
thing is here:

Chander, M.J., & Boyes M. (1982). Social Cognitive Development. In B. B.
Wolman (Ed), Handbook of developmental psychology (pp. 387-402).
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

As they describe it, a child>s (age 2-3) ability to judge the contents
of other people>s minds is likened to a recording device that copies the
world without interpretation. Because of this young children fail the
false belief task, where they are incapable of conceiving that someone
else may believe something that they know is false.

This has nothing to do with the general nature of consciousness and the
perception of reality. No one seriously believes that the brain contains
a copy of reality.

The brain apparently does contain representations that model certain
aspects of reality, but models are not copies.

When the brain (B) operates on sensed external variables (A) to produce
a model (C), it uses information and internal structures developed over
the life and phylogenic history of the organism. Presumably, the brain
has a reentrant structure (i.e. internal feedback) so that the resulting
model can also be taken as another input variable.

All perception is the result of brain processes. If some perceptions
appear more "realistic" than others I would expect that the perceiver
has had some practice making such discriminations and has found that
certain attributes, such as visual clarity, a sense of wakefulness, and
correspondence to intuitive physical properties of the world, have
generally led to satisfactory outcomes. Or at least realistic ones.

--
Joe Legris

Absolute nonsense, Joe. This is the hallmark of representationalism.
In the
case of the "cognitive map" it is quite explicit, but it is usually only
thinly disguised. What the hell is the "prototype" theory for Chrissakes.
Honestly, Joe, it is not like you>re a drooling crack head, but sometimes
you say the......well......dumbest things.
[/quote]
Representationalism is certainly the direction I>m leaning toward but it
means different things to different people. You seem to take it in the
most literal sense possible - representations are little copies of real
objects in the head. I take an information theoretic view -
representations are internal patterns of neural structure or activity.
Some of these representations are internal models. By definition, a
model is not a copy. Models predict only limited aspects of the world,
precisely because it is impossible to capture the entire reality.

Internal models cannot be observed directly (yet) because they are part
of the brain>s overall process - outside the context of the brain of
which they are a part, internal models are effectively indecipherable
patterns.

No one has ever observed a copy of anything in any brain. That is
because there are no copies. We>ve been through this before: if there
were actual copies of anything in the brain then a "brain equivalent"
would be required to make sense of it, which leads to infinite regress.

--
Joe Legris

Joe Legris · Guest

Lester Zick wrote:
[quote]On Thu, 28 Aug 2003 17:37:56 -0400, Joe Legris <jalegris@xympatico.ca
wrote:

Lester Zick wrote:

If copy theory is an inadequate basis on which to explain how the mind
produces what appear to be copies of external phenomena - which I
agree that it is - I would like to ask the following question:

In the absence of copy theory how is it that some external sensation A
is processed or operated on by brain B so as to produce some C as a
non copy of A yet with the ability to operate on C to produce some
apparent copy of A?

There are really two parts to this question:

How does B operate on A to produce some C as a non copy of A?

Such that B can also operate on C to produce some apparently realistic
image of A?

Regards - Lester

remove DEL in address for email

"Copy theory" is a straw-man. The only reference I can find to such a
thing is here:

Chander, M.J., & Boyes M. (1982). Social Cognitive Development. In B. B.
Wolman (Ed), Handbook of developmental psychology (pp. 387-402).
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

As they describe it, a child>s (age 2-3) ability to judge the contents
of other people>s minds is likened to a recording device that copies the
world without interpretation. Because of this young children fail the
false belief task, where they are incapable of conceiving that someone
else may believe something that they know is false.

This has nothing to do with the general nature of consciousness and the
perception of reality. No one seriously believes that the brain contains
a copy of reality.

I>m not so sure but I don>t think we>re dealing here with a critical
path. The Greeks may have conceived of consciousness in such terms.
I>m not really sure. But I think this may have formed a significant
theory of cognition at one time.

The brain apparently does contain representations that model certain
aspects of reality, but models are not copies.

Well I>m not really sure. What ensures or prevents models from being
copies?

When the brain (B) operates on sensed external variables (A) to produce
a model (C), it uses information and internal structures developed over
the life and phylogenic history of the organism. Presumably, the brain
has a reentrant structure (i.e. internal feedback) so that the resulting
model can also be taken as another input variable.

All perception is the result of brain processes. If some perceptions
appear more "realistic" than others I would expect that the perceiver
has had some practice making such discriminations and has found that
certain attributes, such as visual clarity, a sense of wakefulness, and
correspondence to intuitive physical properties of the world, have
generally led to satisfactory outcomes. Or at least realistic ones.

It isn>t the realism that defines the problem exactly. That>s just an
ancillary consideration. I>m just curious how the brain processes A to
produce C such that it is not a mere copy of A.

You state and I agree that what the brain contains is not a copy of
reality. But it is less clear what the contents of the brain are if
not a copy of reality. I think this is really what I>m asking. What is
it that the brain does with A such that C is not a copy of A?

[/quote]
What>s a copy anyway? An exact physical duplicate? A pretty good
physical duplicate? A functional equivalent? An isomorphism? A good
analogy?

An physical duplicate would be completely useless to a brain and
wouldn>t fit in anyway. A functional equivalence would be useful for
making predictions. An isomorphism would be even better because, being a
pure abstraction it could be used as a general model. Same goes for a
good analogy.

This "copy theory" idea is not just a straw-man - it>s a big fat red
herring.

--
Joe Legris

Wolf Kirchmeir · Guest

On Fri, 29 Aug 2003 01:39:25 GMT, Lester Zick wrote:

[quote]Except that a model airplane is a copy of the real thing.
[/quote]
Sorry, I disagree. A copy of the airplane would be the same as the original.
You seem to be using both "copy" and "model" to mean something like "image".
Neither "copy" nor "model" are congruent with "image."

Think about it.

--
Best Wishes,
Wolf Kirchmeir, Blind River ON
"Not that brains are everything --
you>ll also need a skull to put them in." (Nancy Franklin, 1997)
<just one w and plain ca for correct address>

John · Guest

--
johnYYYcoe@tpg.com.au

remove YYY in reply
"Joe Legris" <jalegris@xympatico.ca> wrote in message
news:3F4EC8B6.1000103@xympatico.ca...
[quote]Glen M. Sizemore wrote:

No one has ever observed a copy of anything in any brain. That is
because there are no copies. We>ve been through this before: if there
were actual copies of anything in the brain then a "brain equivalent"
would be required to make sense of it, which leads to infinite regress.
[/quote]

have a look at "mirror neurons". Not copies but now believed to be important
in learning motor skills at least.

http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00002613/
http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/ramachandran/ramachandran_index.html

Lester Zick · Guest

On Fri, 29 Aug 2003 13:08:16 +0100, Thom Baguley
<t.s.baguley@lboro.ac.uk> wrote:

[quote]Lester Zick wrote:
Except that a model airplane is a copy of the real thing. A scaled
copy perhaps but a copy nonetheless. Same with model railroads. In
order not to be a copy there has to be some categorical difference
involved that does not merely represent a percentage of the original
sensation.

The (false) attraction of copy theory is that producing a copy is a process
that requires no explanation. An fact, producing a copy is harder to explain
than producing something that has properties in common with the original.

The fact that the toy models you describe use different materials is
not really relevant. We can assume some change in material between
sensation A and brain output C. But if all we>re left with is a copy
of the original with some change in material substrate, we are still
left with a copy.

I think you have an unusually broad definition of a copy.
[/quote]
That may be. I>m trying to be as inclusive as possible to get at what
is not a copy.
[quote]
However, my take on it is why to you need an output C? Why not merely have
processes that act on A and some kind of ecord of the processing.
[/quote]
Well I might suggest that the some kind of record of the processing is
in fact C. However I think what is more important in having C is the
ability to assign certain characteristics to C which are not A in the
sense of a copy of A and yet allow us to infer or reconstruct A from
C.

In any event the phrase some kind of record of the processing is very
vague and offers no idea of the kind of processing involved. Do we
really reconstruct the light from a star by some reverse processing? I
don>t think so. In point of fact it is the processing that I>m
interested in and not just a record of it. Whatever processing is
involved has to produce some C which is not a copy of A if we are to
avoid the implications of copy theory.

Regards - Lester

remove DEL in address for email

Glen M. Sizemore · Guest

[quote]Lester Zick wrote:

If copy theory is an inadequate basis on which to explain how the mind
produces what appear to be copies of external phenomena - which I
agree that it is - I would like to ask the following question:

In the absence of copy theory how is it that some external sensation A
is processed or operated on by brain B so as to produce some C as a
non copy of A yet with the ability to operate on C to produce some
apparent copy of A?

There are really two parts to this question:

How does B operate on A to produce some C as a non copy of A?

Such that B can also operate on C to produce some apparently realistic
image of A?

Regards - Lester

"Copy theory" is a straw-man. The only reference I can find to such a
thing is here:

Chander, M.J., & Boyes M. (1982). Social Cognitive Development. In B. B.
Wolman (Ed), Handbook of developmental psychology (pp. 387-402).
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

As they describe it, a child>s (age 2-3) ability to judge the contents
of other people>s minds is likened to a recording device that copies the
world without interpretation. Because of this young children fail the
false belief task, where they are incapable of conceiving that someone
else may believe something that they know is false.

This has nothing to do with the general nature of consciousness and the
perception of reality. No one seriously believes that the brain contains
a copy of reality.

The brain apparently does contain representations that model certain
aspects of reality, but models are not copies.

When the brain (B) operates on sensed external variables (A) to produce
a model (C), it uses information and internal structures developed
over>>the life and phylogenic history of the organism. Presumably, the brain
has a reentrant structure (i.e. internal feedback) so that the resulting
model can also be taken as another input variable.

All perception is the result of brain processes. If some perceptions
appear more "realistic" than others I would expect that the perceiver
has had some practice making such discriminations and has found that
certain attributes, such as visual clarity, a sense of wakefulness, and
correspondence to intuitive physical properties of the world, have
generally led to satisfactory outcomes. Or at least realistic ones.

--
Joe Legris

Absolute nonsense, Joe. This is the hallmark of representationalism.
In the
case of the "cognitive map" it is quite explicit, but it is usually only
thinly disguised. What the hell is the "prototype" theory for Chrissakes.
Honestly, Joe, it is not like you>re a drooling crack head, but sometimes
you say the......well......dumbest things.
[/quote]
JL: Representationalism is certainly the direction I>m leaning toward but it
means different things to different people. You seem to take it in the
most literal sense possible - representations are little copies of real
objects in the head. I take an information theoretic view -
representations are internal patterns of neural structure or activity.
Some of these representations are internal models. By definition, a
model is not a copy. Models predict only limited aspects of the world,
precisely because it is impossible to capture the entire reality.

GS: But this doesn>t get around the problem of homunculism. Model, copy,
representation......they still are the thing that is seen, heard, felt,
tasted etc. etc. etc.

JL: Internal models cannot be observed directly (yet) because they are part
of the brain>s overall process - outside the context of the brain of
which they are a part, internal models are effectively indecipherable
patterns.

GS: But they are what the person observes, right?

JL: No one has ever observed a copy of anything in any brain. That is
because there are no copies.

GS: Oh......right.......there are only models. Big difference there, Joe.

JL: We>ve been through this before: if there
were actual copies of anything in the brain then a "brain equivalent"
would be required to make sense of it, which leads to infinite regress.

GS: The same is true of "models" in the brain.

"Joe Legris" <jalegris@xympatico.ca> wrote in message
news:3F4EC8B6.1000103@xympatico.ca...
[quote]Glen M. Sizemore wrote:

"Joe Legris" <jalegris@xympatico.ca> wrote in message
news:3F4E7634.6010006@xympatico.ca...

Lester Zick wrote:

If copy theory is an inadequate basis on which to explain how the mind
produces what appear to be copies of external phenomena - which I
agree that it is - I would like to ask the following question:

In the absence of copy theory how is it that some external sensation A
is processed or operated on by brain B so as to produce some C as a
non copy of A yet with the ability to operate on C to produce some
apparent copy of A?

There are really two parts to this question:

How does B operate on A to produce some C as a non copy of A?

Such that B can also operate on C to produce some apparently realistic
image of A?

Regards - Lester

"Copy theory" is a straw-man. The only reference I can find to such a
thing is here:

Chander, M.J., & Boyes M. (1982). Social Cognitive Development. In B. B.
Wolman (Ed), Handbook of developmental psychology (pp. 387-402).
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

As they describe it, a child>s (age 2-3) ability to judge the contents
of other people>s minds is likened to a recording device that copies the
world without interpretation. Because of this young children fail the
false belief task, where they are incapable of conceiving that someone
else may believe something that they know is false.

This has nothing to do with the general nature of consciousness and the
perception of reality. No one seriously believes that the brain contains
a copy of reality.

The brain apparently does contain representations that model certain
aspects of reality, but models are not copies.

When the brain (B) operates on sensed external variables (A) to produce
a model (C), it uses information and internal structures developed over
the life and phylogenic history of the organism. Presumably, the brain
has a reentrant structure (i.e. internal feedback) so that the resulting
model can also be taken as another input variable.

All perception is the result of brain processes. If some perceptions
appear more "realistic" than others I would expect that the perceiver
has had some practice making such discriminations and has found that
certain attributes, such as visual clarity, a sense of wakefulness, and
correspondence to intuitive physical properties of the world, have
generally led to satisfactory outcomes. Or at least realistic ones.

--
Joe Legris

Absolute nonsense, Joe. This is the hallmark of representationalism.
In the
case of the "cognitive map" it is quite explicit, but it is usually
only
thinly disguised. What the hell is the "prototype" theory for
Chrissakes.
Honestly, Joe, it is not like you>re a drooling crack head, but
sometimes
you say the......well......dumbest things.

Representationalism is certainly the direction I>m leaning toward but it
means different things to different people. You seem to take it in the
most literal sense possible - representations are little copies of real
objects in the head. I take an information theoretic view -
representations are internal patterns of neural structure or activity.
Some of these representations are internal models. By definition, a
model is not a copy. Models predict only limited aspects of the world,
precisely because it is impossible to capture the entire reality.

Internal models cannot be observed directly (yet) because they are part
of the brain>s overall process - outside the context of the brain of
which they are a part, internal models are effectively indecipherable
patterns.

No one has ever observed a copy of anything in any brain. That is
because there are no copies. We>ve been through this before: if there
were actual copies of anything in the brain then a "brain equivalent"
would be required to make sense of it, which leads to infinite regress.

--
Joe Legris
[/quote]

Lester Zick · Guest

On Fri, 29 Aug 2003 12:15:44 -0400 (EDT), "Wolf Kirchmeir"
<wwolfkir@sympatico.can> wrote:

[quote]On Fri, 29 Aug 2003 01:39:25 GMT, Lester Zick wrote:

Except that a model airplane is a copy of the real thing.

Sorry, I disagree. A copy of the airplane would be the same as the original.
You seem to be using both "copy" and "model" to mean something like "image".
Neither "copy" nor "model" are congruent with "image."

You know I got to thinking about this after posting. I don>t disagree[/quote]
that what happens is a model. I think the question is what kind of
model we>re looking at.

In my estimation there are at least two kinds of copy theories to
consider in this regard: naive copy theory in which the whole thing is
considered to be copied in the brain and more sophisticated theories
in which parts or elements of the thing copied are copied in the brain
and the result is put together or modified from those elements.

In either case a copy of an airplane need not be an exact copy of the
original. Certainly it would not be in size and it is generally not in
terms of material if what you>re talking about are ordinary toy
models. I would call a toy model a model and it could be called an
image in addition. But it would be a copy of the original nonetheless.

On the other hand I would not call a copy of the original which
differed in size or material an image rather than a copy. The term
image seems more visual in nature. What I think we have to decide is
what happens between the perception of the original and production of
a model. We could still have a model which mimicked the original
without necessarily have some kind of cognitive copy of the original
as the result of A --> B --> C.

Regards - Lester

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Lester Zick · Guest

On Thu, 28 Aug 2003 23:29:58 -0400, Joe Legris <jalegris@xympatico.ca>
wrote:

[. . .]
[quote]
Representationalism is certainly the direction I>m leaning toward but it
means different things to different people. You seem to take it in the
most literal sense possible - representations are little copies of real
objects in the head. I take an information theoretic view -
representations are internal patterns of neural structure or activity.
Some of these representations are internal models. By definition, a
model is not a copy. Models predict only limited aspects of the world,
precisely because it is impossible to capture the entire reality.

I>m not sure why a model cannot be a copy. Certainly as a matter of[/quote]
definition. I think a copy would be a model in any event just as the
original is a model for the original. What needs to be decided is what
makes a copy a copy and what makes something not a copy. Then the
original question of whether a model is a copy can be decided
accordingly. Either way you>re going to have a model but not
necessarily a copy.

Regards - Lester

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Joe Legris · Guest

Lester Zick wrote:
[quote]On Thu, 28 Aug 2003 23:29:58 -0400, Joe Legris <jalegris@xympatico.ca
wrote:

[. . .]

Representationalism is certainly the direction I>m leaning toward but it
means different things to different people. You seem to take it in the
most literal sense possible - representations are little copies of real
objects in the head. I take an information theoretic view -
representations are internal patterns of neural structure or activity.
Some of these representations are internal models. By definition, a
model is not a copy. Models predict only limited aspects of the world,
precisely because it is impossible to capture the entire reality.

I>m not sure why a model cannot be a copy. Certainly as a matter of
definition. I think a copy would be a model in any event just as the
original is a model for the original. What needs to be decided is what
makes a copy a copy and what makes something not a copy. Then the
original question of whether a model is a copy can be decided
accordingly. Either way you>re going to have a model but not
necessarily a copy.

[/quote]
If you define a model as a simplified representation of a system then it
is not a copy by definition. End of argument.

Models in the brain are distillations of the aspects of reality that are
relevant to the organism. For example, a brain may contain a ballistic
model that allows one to predict where a thrown rock will land. The
relevant aspect of such a model is the relationship between perceived
heft of an object and it>s expected trajectory when thrown with a
particular effort. It is conceivable that the brain actually solves the
differential equation of motion using a neural network that has been
tuned over years of practice. Such a model says nothing and need say
nothing about any other aspect of projectile throwing. Through neural
connections to rest of the brain it receives inputs about the mass of
the rock and the intention of the thrower and produces outputs about the
expected range. Of course, we cannot yet demonstrate the existence of
such a model, but it is at least plausible and reasonably parsimonious.

Compare this with a copy of a rock and a copy of the space surrounding
the organism. It is patently ridiculous. Why so much detail? Is it
necessary to include every little stone on the ground as well? How about
the individual leaves on the trees? If you are fully invested in the
copy theory you would probably want to do so just in case the organism
decides to use a different rock, or chooses another target. Of course,
we cannot yet demonstrate the existence of such a model, and we
certainly never will. It is implausible, wasteful of neural resources,
inflexible (what if it>s an indoor game of volleyball rather than
outdoor rock throwing) and completely unparsimonious.

--
Joe Legris


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