Science and Technology news... :: View topic

Lester Zick · Guest

On Fri, 10 Oct 2003 16:52:42 GMT, realistic@seanet.com (Richard F
Hall) in sci.philosophy.meta wrote:

[quote]I am here proposing a game.
The following paragraphs are an edited mixture of the writings of
Lester Zick and myself. The entire thinking of this piece was begun
by Lester and you will find his writing spliced into the fabric of
this post. In some sentences, from the original post, the words have
been rearranged to illuminate and clarify the ideas. I have the
feeling that there is more to be said and I am inviting anyone,
especially Lester, to build, or detract, on this basis.

Solipsism, the forgotten Art.

We will progress from here with the idea that degrading the soliptic
position, expanding one>s mind, by exploring the solipstic question is
a positive step in a persons intellectual maturation. From my
understanding, solipsism is the theory that nothing other than that
which is inside one>s self can be "proven" to oneself. It doesn>t
preclude that there is something… outside. If one is new to this
question, it does cast doubt on it though. This proof is the
solipstic question.
[/quote]
I want it to be clear that the reason that the issue of solipsism is
important is as a limiting extreme in opposition to materialism. As an
intellectual doctrine in its own right it doesn>t really have much
value except perhaps in historical terms. However as an exposition of
pure subjectivism it has enormous analytical value to the extent that
materialism represents the exposition of pure objectivism.

In the case of solipsism all subjective and objective circumstances
are considered manifestations of and subject to the the will of the
cognitive individual. Conversely in the case of materialism all
subjective and objective circumstances are considered manifestations
of objective circumstances apart from any will of the individual.

[quote]
An important aspect of the solipstic question is the individual>s
assessment of the nature and origin of every one of their
operating/behavioral precepts. These psychological phenomenon of
assessment and alteration are determined by
1) someone "out there" who then changes your life, either on an
involuntary basis, due to their authority, or a voluntarily, due to
your respect for their authority, or
2) one>s own understanding and acceptance of what has been perceived
to be true "out there", or
3) solipstically, the determination and comparison of one>s present
precepts with what one has thought to be true in the past, though not
based on objective criterion.

In point of fact, in #3, we often have no immediate way to decide
where, exactly, the origins can and do lie, how important they are to
us, and what recourse do we have if we delete them. This effort
described in #3 can be exceedingly traumatic and life altering.
[/quote]
As an observation these origins can only lie within the cognitive
individual - the one cognizing the circumstances. And it is only
through processes of deductive inference that we discover where their
actual origin is.

[quote]
To start this process we can refer to an objective definition of the
objective as the "non-subjective". This will be necessary to vitiate
the solipsist view in universal terms. The great barrier here is that
in the final analysis, everything is subjective. So, we can>t expect
to totally vitiate the solipist view and emerge into a realistic,
non-subjective world. For, to answer this question one must begin to
define who and what one is and establish a personally acceptable line
between the subjective and the non-subjective. This is not a silly
past-time, this can be a mind altering exercise that clears one>s
vision.

It>s certainly true that the origin of most non-subjective
circumstances lie outside us. But that>s really only because the bulk
of objectively definable circumstances do, and not because the
non-subjective definition of the objective requires, or precludes,
such a thing of necessity. Since the introduction of the scientific
method with its "trinity of realistic observation": repeatability,
reliability, and consistency, and its media of interaction and sharing
among numerous mind/brains, we can be lulled into a comfortable
position of imagining that all this is already worked out, and handed
to us, prearranged and compartmentalized, on the shinning silver
platter of life. But, the proof of all pudding is still subjective,
in the final analysis, and where one draws the analytical line between
the subjective and the non-subjective is still another question.
Unless one considers the solipstic question seriously, one may not
even comprehend that this line is in question.

I realize this may seem like a rather fine distinction. However it>s
important to grasp that this is where we actually get our notions of
inside and outside. It>s also a point that has been completely
misunderstood throughout intellectual and psychological history and
has led to all kinds of pernicious conflicts and misinterpretations.
As long as these analytical misunderstandings are apparently required
for the human condition, the pernicious conflicts and
misinterpretations are, unfortunately, bound to continue.

Since everything is, in the final analysis subjective,
[/quote]
I think this is misleading. Everything in the final analysis is not
subjective. The origin of everything that we can or do know lies in
the subjective. But the final result does not necessarily. The final
result is either subjective or objective according to the nature of
the circumstances analyzed.

[quote] one must
consider that the inside and outside do not refer to physical locale
in terms of the brain/mind complex. These terms simply refer to the
control or lack of control of the objective by the subjective. That
and nothing more. The subjective lies within control of the
mind/brain. But the objective, one would think, lies outside control
of the subjective to the extent it has or could have a non-subjective
definition. The demons that must be castigated and the precepts that
must be questioned are those things that are misinterpreted as
non-subjective and yet, still fail to fall into the realm of the
objective.
[/quote]
Here you>re losing me Rich. How can something interpreted as non
subjective fail to fall into the realm of the objective since the
objective is defined to be the non subjective? And that basis for
interpretation is what governs whether the something is objective or
not? It>s not clear what you have in mind.

I suppose what I>m suggesting is that a thing which is not subjective
has to be objective for that reason. Whereas what you seem to be
implying is that it is possible for something non subjective to be
interpreted or misinterpreted as objective despite being non
subjective. And I>m uncertain why you say this. You seem to be
suggesting that there is some way for something to appear non
subjective which is not.

If you>re addressing things like dreams, hallucinations, etc. I think
you>ll find that they are objective things because they have or can
have objective definitions according to their circumstances. It is
true that they may not actually represent what we might otherwise
think. But they are nonetheless objective phenomena. The only issue is
whether they are what we think them to be and not whether they are
objective.

[quote]
Once they are determined, it should be noted, they need not be
deleted, for one might find these ideas to be a pillar of one>s
cognitive construction. The first step is to merely identify and
label them like some mythical tree surgeon who is planning a
magnificent garden.

Richard F Hall
Realistic Idealism
http://www.seanet.com/~realistic/idealism.html
fertile soil for thought, a measure of truth.
[/quote]

Regards - Lester

David Longley · Guest

Somewhat on the same theme:

http://www.longley.demon.co.uk/Frag.htm, papers on "What Works" and the
efficacy of "Cognitive Skills" rehabilitative programmes in the field of
Corrections.

In message <3f8571e6.59092930@netnews.att.net>, Lester Zick
<lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net> writes
[quote]On 8 Oct 2003 18:29:42 -0700, rickleeland@yahoo.com (Rick Leeland) in
sci.cognitive wrote:

(fixed a typo)

Good topic! I have been following this thread for a few days. Have we
reached a consensus yet? For those who firmly believe in Solipsism,
please send all your life-savings to me to prove your faith. I am with
you all the way -- believe me, it won>t cost you a thing since
everything you see is merely a subjective illusion.

-- Rick

Oh, well, I rather doubt we>ll ever reach a consensus in terms of non
critical thinkers and non critical thinking. They>ll just go along
thinking whatever they want just because they can think whatever they
want and see no special reason to change their opinions on this or any
other topic on which they hold strong beliefs. At least I have never
known anyone to change opinions or strongly held beliefs.

For critical thinkers on the other hand I think we may have broken
some new ground with respect to the actual meaning and significance of
the objective. The interesting thing about solipsism and the reason it
continues to hang around and continues to be discussed and taught is
that it actually represents one limiting extreme in intellectual
terms.

The other extreme is materialism. Thus solipsism in simple analytical
terms represents pure subjectivism whereas materialism represents pure
objectivism. They are just opposing exclusive views of the mind and
the nature of reality in general. Solipsism represents reality in
purely subjective terms and materialism represents reality in purely
objective terms. And the question then becomes where the truth lies
and why.

Of course no one actually tries to live in solipsist terms any more
than a materialist tries to act in materialist terms. Each comes to
terms with the nature of reality on a daily basis. However a great
many are led to think and believe one way or the other because they do
not understand how to synthesize reality in realistic terms.

The materialist claims to have science on his side because a great
many intellectual frontiers have been successfully addressed and
conquered in such terms. Whereas the solipsist has on his side the
very practical observation and fact that we all think in subjective
terms to begin with.

The difference is that neither can explain how we get from subjective
thought to objective cognition or vice versa. The solipsist sees the
nature of reality exclusively in terms of subjective thought. The
materialist sees reality exclusively in terms of objective cognitive
circumstances without respect to where these circumstances originate
and how they come to be. And all the intellectual and philosophical
wars - and some of the real wars - of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries have been fought in such terms.

lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) wrote in message
news:<3f678ae1.36613700@netnews.att.net>...
Solipsism Again and Again and Again

The idea of solipsism is undoubtedly old and pretty thoroughly
discussed. But rehashing the topic has failed to convince anyone in
exhaustive terms as far as I can tell simply because the terms of the
discussion are invariably irrelevant to the issues.

There are three primary variants in the subjective/objective debate
concerning reality in general: conventional realism - emphasizing
some combination of subjective and objective aspects to reality -
solipsism with its conclusive emphasis on purely subjective aspects of
reality - and materialism with its conclusive emphasis on purely
objective aspects of reality.

But the whole debate really boils down to the nature of the subjective
in general and the nature of the objective in general. And no one that
I can see discusses solipsism in such simple terms. For if the
objective has an objective definition - that is if the non subjective
has a non subjective definition - then the whole idea and possibility
of solipsism disappears.

In other words we aren>t really interested in whether it>s all in here
or all out there or whether there is some mix of the two. The terms of
analysis themselves show what>s in here and what>s out there. In
actuality the subjective is in here for strictly mechanical reasons
and the objective is out there for strictly mechanical reasons. And
that>s really all such ideas as in here versus out there can mean.

So if the appropriate analytical terms are applied to the concepts of
the subjective and objective we can see in very elementary terms the
why>s and wherefore>s of solipsism and even those of materialism for
that matter.

The whole idea of an objective definition for the objective shows
exactly why solipsism and materialism are both nonsense and does so in
rigorous analytical terms. If by the objective we mean the non
subjective then an objective definition for the objective proves and
validates the objective as a non subjective analytical category with
no subjective component. Otherwise not. It>s just that simple.

It doesn>t matter who>s out there or who>s in here. Or whether we all
exist in the eye of god. Whether or not any such things are or could
be true in any sense is completely irrelevant to whether the objective
can be objectively defined in non subjective terms. If so the
definition itself is objective and proves that there are non
subjective aspects to reality in general. And if and to the extent
that the objective means the non subjective, it has that objective
definition.

Regards - Lester

Regards - Lester

[/quote]
--
David Longley

Lester Zick · Guest

On Sun, 12 Oct 2003 16:09:07 +0100, David Longley
<David@longley.demon.co.uk> in sci.philosophy.meta wrote:

[quote]Somewhat on the same theme:

http://www.longley.demon.co.uk/Frag.htm, papers on "What Works" and the
efficacy of "Cognitive Skills" rehabilitative programmes in the field of
Corrections.

David -[/quote]

I appreciate the contribution. I am currently in the process of
reading through the document. However it is a little difficult to
judge the relevance of the solipsism/materialism analysis to it.

On prior occasions as I recall we>ve had discussions primarily along
the lines of behaviorism vs. cognitive science. Obviously you are a
trained professional so I wonder if you would mind explaining how the
solipsism/materialism dichotomy applies to the practical problems of
institutionalized management you address in this context.

Regards - Lester

David Longley · Guest

In message <3f8985f7.31980332@netnews.att.net>, Lester Zick
<lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net> writes
[quote]On Sun, 12 Oct 2003 16:09:07 +0100, David Longley
David@longley.demon.co.uk> in sci.philosophy.meta wrote:

Somewhat on the same theme:

http://www.longley.demon.co.uk/Frag.htm, papers on "What Works" and the
efficacy of "Cognitive Skills" rehabilitative programmes in the field of
Corrections.

David -

I appreciate the contribution. I am currently in the process of
reading through the document. However it is a little difficult to
judge the relevance of the solipsism/materialism analysis to it.

On prior occasions as I recall we>ve had discussions primarily along
the lines of behaviorism vs. cognitive science. Obviously you are a
trained professional so I wonder if you would mind explaining how the
solipsism/materialism dichotomy applies to the practical problems of
institutionalized management you address in this context.

Regards - Lester

[/quote]
You>ll appreciate that when you see what I say with respect to Fodor>s
(1980) paper "Methodological solipsism....." which figures in the early
pages of "Fragments" - I wouldn>t say the alternative is so much
materialism, as naturalism and extensionalism.

For the practical downside you have to see the "What Works" papers at
the above website and then:

See: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/r206.pdf
and http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/r205.pdf

--
David Longley

Lester Zick · Guest

On Sun, 12 Oct 2003 22:06:33 +0100, David Longley
<David@longley.demon.co.uk> in sci.cognitive wrote:

[quote]In message <3f8985f7.31980332@netnews.att.net>, Lester Zick
lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net> writes
On Sun, 12 Oct 2003 16:09:07 +0100, David Longley
David@longley.demon.co.uk> in sci.philosophy.meta wrote:

Somewhat on the same theme:

http://www.longley.demon.co.uk/Frag.htm, papers on "What Works" and the
efficacy of "Cognitive Skills" rehabilitative programmes in the field of
Corrections.

David -

I appreciate the contribution. I am currently in the process of
reading through the document. However it is a little difficult to
judge the relevance of the solipsism/materialism analysis to it.

On prior occasions as I recall we>ve had discussions primarily along
the lines of behaviorism vs. cognitive science. Obviously you are a
trained professional so I wonder if you would mind explaining how the
solipsism/materialism dichotomy applies to the practical problems of
institutionalized management you address in this context.

Regards - Lester

You>ll appreciate that when you see what I say with respect to Fodor>s
(1980) paper "Methodological solipsism....." which figures in the early
pages of "Fragments" - I wouldn>t say the alternative is so much
materialism, as naturalism and extensionalism.
[/quote]
Thanks. I found the section indicated. But I found no specific
reference to naturalism or extensionalism. And I am unclear what the
term methodological solipsism means exactly or how it differs from
solipsism in general.

However let me quote from my version of the Random House Dictionary of
the English Language, College Edition, 1968, in regard to materialism
and naturalism:

materialism - 1. the philosophical theory that regards matter and its
motions as constituting the universe, and all phenomena, including
those of mind, as due to material agencies. 2. attention to or
emphasis on material objects, needs, and considerations with a
disinterest in or rejection of spiritual values.

naturalism - 1-4. literary and artistic meanings . . . 5. Philos. a.
the view that all objects and events are capable of being accounted
for by scientific explanation usually allied with the ontological
claim that there are no nonnatural objects, process, causes, etc. b.
the view that moral judgments are factual statements and refer to
empirically verifiable phenomena. 6. Theol. the doctrine that all
religious truth is derived from a study of natural processes and not
from relevation. 7. adherence or attachment to what is natural.

Now let me emphasize that I have no professional training in
psychology - theoretical or applied. Consequently it is possible to
misconstrue the technical emphasis of psychological terminology.

However notwithstanding this the dictionary definitions cited above
concur exactly with my understanding of the terms and reinforce my own
interpretation of materialism as the antithesis of solipsism. Of
course both interpretations rest primarily on the definition of the
objective vs the subjective and the imputation of those terms to
materialism and solipsism respectively.

I think a reasonable case can be made that naturalism represents the
intellectual parent of materialism. And I am certainly uncomfortable
with the reliance of naturalism on empirical verification in the
context of 5.b. above. However given the definitions cited I regard my
own interpretation of pure objectivism as corresponding directly to
materialism rather than alternatives is completely justified.

In any event thanks for the informed assistance.

[quote]
For the practical downside you have to see the "What Works" papers at
the above website and then:

See: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/r206.pdf
and http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/r205.pdf

--
David Longley
[/quote]

Regards - Lester

David Longley · Guest

In message <3f89ea2c.48073416@netnews.att.net>, Lester Zick
<lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net> writes
[quote]On Sun, 12 Oct 2003 22:06:33 +0100, David Longley
David@longley.demon.co.uk> in sci.cognitive wrote:

In message <3f8985f7.31980332@netnews.att.net>, Lester Zick
lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net> writes
On Sun, 12 Oct 2003 16:09:07 +0100, David Longley
David@longley.demon.co.uk> in sci.philosophy.meta wrote:

Somewhat on the same theme:

http://www.longley.demon.co.uk/Frag.htm, papers on "What Works" and the
efficacy of "Cognitive Skills" rehabilitative programmes in the field of
Corrections.

David -

I appreciate the contribution. I am currently in the process of
reading through the document. However it is a little difficult to
judge the relevance of the solipsism/materialism analysis to it.

On prior occasions as I recall we>ve had discussions primarily along
the lines of behaviorism vs. cognitive science. Obviously you are a
trained professional so I wonder if you would mind explaining how the
solipsism/materialism dichotomy applies to the practical problems of
institutionalized management you address in this context.

Regards - Lester

You>ll appreciate that when you see what I say with respect to Fodor>s
(1980) paper "Methodological solipsism....." which figures in the early
pages of "Fragments" - I wouldn>t say the alternative is so much
materialism, as naturalism and extensionalism.

Thanks. I found the section indicated. But I found no specific
reference to naturalism or extensionalism. And I am unclear what the
term methodological solipsism means exactly or how it differs from
solipsism in general.

However let me quote from my version of the Random House Dictionary of
the English Language, College Edition, 1968, in regard to materialism
and naturalism:

materialism - 1. the philosophical theory that regards matter and its
motions as constituting the universe, and all phenomena, including
those of mind, as due to material agencies. 2. attention to or
emphasis on material objects, needs, and considerations with a
disinterest in or rejection of spiritual values.

naturalism - 1-4. literary and artistic meanings . . . 5. Philos. a.
the view that all objects and events are capable of being accounted
for by scientific explanation usually allied with the ontological
claim that there are no nonnatural objects, process, causes, etc. b.
the view that moral judgments are factual statements and refer to
empirically verifiable phenomena. 6. Theol. the doctrine that all
religious truth is derived from a study of natural processes and not
from relevation. 7. adherence or attachment to what is natural.

Now let me emphasize that I have no professional training in
psychology - theoretical or applied. Consequently it is possible to
misconstrue the technical emphasis of psychological terminology.

However notwithstanding this the dictionary definitions cited above
concur exactly with my understanding of the terms and reinforce my own
interpretation of materialism as the antithesis of solipsism. Of
course both interpretations rest primarily on the definition of the
objective vs the subjective and the imputation of those terms to
materialism and solipsism respectively.

I think a reasonable case can be made that naturalism represents the
intellectual parent of materialism. And I am certainly uncomfortable
with the reliance of naturalism on empirical verification in the
context of 5.b. above. However given the definitions cited I regard my
own interpretation of pure objectivism as corresponding directly to
materialism rather than alternatives is completely justified.

In any event thanks for the informed assistance.

[/quote]
Well, one way of seeing that there is a problem with "materialism" is
that lots of our science doesn>t deal with anything to do with physical
*objects* per se, but with functional relations where what we refer to
as objects are just place holders. What>s important is whether or not
what we are talking about can be made the determinate value of a
variable. This has nothing to do with the change from Newtonian to
Einsteinian determinism (except perhaps as an illustration), but it does
have a lot to do with the difference between Aristotelian and Fregian
logic. Notions such as the subject and object sentences along with
derived concepts like subjectivity & objectivity get transformed along
the way.

Persevere with "Fragments" there>s more to it than some initially think.

[quote]
For the practical downside you have to see the "What Works" papers at
the above website and then:

See: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/r206.pdf
and http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/r205.pdf

--
David Longley

Regards - Lester

[/quote]
--
David Longley

Lester Zick · Guest

On Tue, 14 Oct 2003 13:41:13 +0100, David Longley
<David@longley.demon.co.uk> in sci.cognitive wrote:

[quote]In message <3f89ea2c.48073416@netnews.att.net>, Lester Zick
lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net> writes
On Sun, 12 Oct 2003 22:06:33 +0100, David Longley
David@longley.demon.co.uk> in sci.cognitive wrote:
[/quote]
[. . .]

[quote]You>ll appreciate that when you see what I say with respect to Fodor>s
(1980) paper "Methodological solipsism....." which figures in the early
pages of "Fragments" - I wouldn>t say the alternative is so much
materialism, as naturalism and extensionalism.

Thanks. I found the section indicated. But I found no specific
reference to naturalism or extensionalism. And I am unclear what the
term methodological solipsism means exactly or how it differs from
solipsism in general.

However let me quote from my version of the Random House Dictionary of
the English Language, College Edition, 1968, in regard to materialism
and naturalism:

materialism - 1. the philosophical theory that regards matter and its
motions as constituting the universe, and all phenomena, including
those of mind, as due to material agencies. 2. attention to or
emphasis on material objects, needs, and considerations with a
disinterest in or rejection of spiritual values.

naturalism - 1-4. literary and artistic meanings . . . 5. Philos. a.
the view that all objects and events are capable of being accounted
for by scientific explanation usually allied with the ontological
claim that there are no nonnatural objects, process, causes, etc. b.
the view that moral judgments are factual statements and refer to
empirically verifiable phenomena. 6. Theol. the doctrine that all
religious truth is derived from a study of natural processes and not
from relevation. 7. adherence or attachment to what is natural.

Now let me emphasize that I have no professional training in
psychology - theoretical or applied. Consequently it is possible to
misconstrue the technical emphasis of psychological terminology.

However notwithstanding this the dictionary definitions cited above
concur exactly with my understanding of the terms and reinforce my own
interpretation of materialism as the antithesis of solipsism. Of
course both interpretations rest primarily on the definition of the
objective vs the subjective and the imputation of those terms to
materialism and solipsism respectively.

I think a reasonable case can be made that naturalism represents the
intellectual parent of materialism. And I am certainly uncomfortable
with the reliance of naturalism on empirical verification in the
context of 5.b. above. However given the definitions cited I regard my
own interpretation of pure objectivism as corresponding directly to
materialism rather than alternatives is completely justified.

In any event thanks for the informed assistance.

Well, one way of seeing that there is a problem with "materialism" is
that lots of our science doesn>t deal with anything to do with physical
*objects* per se, but with functional relations where what we refer to
as objects are just place holders. What>s important is whether or not
what we are talking about can be made the determinate value of a
variable. This has nothing to do with the change from Newtonian to
Einsteinian determinism (except perhaps as an illustration), but it does
have a lot to do with the difference between Aristotelian and Fregian
logic. Notions such as the subject and object sentences along with
derived concepts like subjectivity & objectivity get transformed along
the way.
[/quote]
Syllogistic inference may not be a very comprehensive approach to
logic in general but I think it>s the only demonstrated systematic
approach to the subject we have at present. However I prefer an
alternative methodological approach to logic that I would have to
describe as analytical logic which I believe turns out to be
comprehensive.

Whether there are also alternatives I>m not familiar with is not
something I can address in this regard. But I consider that such terms
as objective and subjective are themselves adequately defined for
analytical use in objective terms. And I consider that an objective
definition for the objective constitutes a systematically self
validating objective concept for that reason.
[quote]
Persevere with "Fragments" there>s more to it than some initially think.
[/quote]
It>s an ongoing process. Any clues would be very much appreciated.
[quote]

For the practical downside you have to see the "What Works" papers at
the above website and then:

See: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/r206.pdf
and http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/r205.pdf

--
David Longley

Regards - Lester

--
David Longley
[/quote]

Regards - Lester

Lester Zick · Guest

On Tue, 14 Oct 2003 13:41:13 +0100, David Longley
<David@longley.demon.co.uk> in sci.cognitive wrote:

[. . .]
[quote]
Well, one way of seeing that there is a problem with "materialism" is
that lots of our science doesn>t deal with anything to do with physical
*objects* per se, but with functional relations where what we refer to
as objects are just place holders. What>s important is whether or not
what we are talking about can be made the determinate value of a
variable. This has nothing to do with the change from Newtonian to
Einsteinian determinism (except perhaps as an illustration), but it does
have a lot to do with the difference between Aristotelian and Fregian
logic. Notions such as the subject and object sentences along with
derived concepts like subjectivity & objectivity get transformed along
the way.

On further consideration I would like to reply to certain other[/quote]
aspects of this post as well.

I don>t consider that the problem with materialism lies so much with
reliance on physical objects per se nor with the determinism of those
objects. Subjectivity and objectivity don>t depend on whether objects
are determinate but on the contextual origin of the objects
considered.

In other words I don>t consider things indeterminate in form or
content whether subjective or objective in origin. It>s true that many
would but I see no reason to suggest that this is the case. However I
do think there is an issue with respect to determinability and the
empirical measurement of content.

I strongly suspect that the mechanical nature of the subjective
renders objective measurement of subjective circumstances impossible.
We note objective consequences of the subjective but have no way to
judge and no way to evaluate subjective circumstances in objective
terms because the exact cause or causes of those circumstances are
inherently ambiguous.

The same would apply to any cognitive or perceptual circumstance. It>s
just that the nature of the mechanical processes involved render the
causes ambiguous and not that the process itself is indeterminate or
that the variables themselves are unknowable in any fundamental sense.
Whatever happens to produce cognition does so for very definite
reasons. But due to the nature of the processes involved there is no
ability to determine which cognitive circumstances produces which
cognitive result.

This is not taken to be the result of supposed quantum indeterminacy
in any sense. Whether or not quantum effects play any role in
cognition is unclear. But I don>t regard quantum effects themselves as
any more indeterminate that cognitive circumstances.

What all this suggests is that empiricism in the form of experimental
measurement and analysis is not applicable to the comprehension of
cognition in general. This is why materialism as a cognitive doctrine
is incorrect. It is just not appropriate to the objective measure of
subjective circumstances because those circumstances are inherently
ambiguous with respect to objective circumstances.

We can say with considerable precision what objective circumstances
there are. But we cannot say which subjective circumstances caused
those objective circumstances with any finality. We could measure both
because both are determinate in nature. We just can never be certain
which subjective circumstances to measure in any given instance.

Regards - Lester

Lester Zick · Guest

On Tue, 14 Oct 2003 13:41:13 +0100, David Longley
<David@longley.demon.co.uk> in sci.cognitive wrote:

[. . .]
[quote]
Well, one way of seeing that there is a problem with "materialism" is
that lots of our science doesn>t deal with anything to do with physical
*objects* per se, but with functional relations where what we refer to
as objects are just place holders. What>s important is whether or not
what we are talking about can be made the determinate value of a
variable. This has nothing to do with the change from Newtonian to
Einsteinian determinism (except perhaps as an illustration), but it does
have a lot to do with the difference between Aristotelian and Fregian
logic. Notions such as the subject and object sentences along with
derived concepts like subjectivity & objectivity get transformed along
the way.

I would like to add a few comments with respect to Frege and predicate[/quote]
calculus.

As far as I can tell Frege>s predicate calculus just analyzes the
treatment of objective circumstances and not their phenomenological
origin or existence. On the other hand my own analysis is intended to
treat the nature, origin, and character of subjective circumstances
generally and the emergence of objective circumstances within that
context.

When I use the terms subjective and objective it is intended with that
in mind. The predicate calculus assumes the existence of objective
circumstances and analyzes the properties of such circumstances
without regard to origin. In other words its scope with respect to
behavior derives from the analysis of objective circumstances as
opposed to subjective circumstances.

This is the whole problem with epistemology both ancient and modern.
We elicit the explanation for problems in objective terms because they
are accessible to us. We measure and manipulate what we can in those
terms and then claim to have analyzed the general problem because this
is all that is available for empirical examination and analysis.

However we have not really explained the origin of the analytical
variables themselves. Hence we have no exact way to be sure what the
actual implications of the analysis may be. Conventional psychology
can only analyze objective circumstances of behavior in this regard
even though it realizes that those circumstances themselves originate
in the subjective circumstances of the individual. Consequently it is
put in the untenable position of measuring what it can without knowing
how its measurements are relevant to the underlying psychology.

Now there may be better alternatives available. I know there are
alternatives but I can>t say for certain that they are better or not
because the issues I address in this respect are metaphysical and
ontological in nature and not psychological or behavioral. My only
interest lies in establishing the nature and properties of reality in
general and of the subjective and objective characteristics of
ontological beings in mechanical terms.

And I hope this clarifies my perspective with respect to behavioral
analysis in purely objective terms.

Regards - Lester

neepy · Guest

danny_purvis@hotmail.com (Danny Purvis) wrote in message news:<9a2dfd4d.0310100754.a1df201@posting.google.com>...
[quote]
I am gradually flashing on the fact that my conception of
solipsism might be, well, solipsistic.
[/quote]
I think it was Russell who told the story of meeting someone who told
him they had been convinced long ago of the correctness of solipsism,
and were surprised that more people did not share that view.


www.GetXFactor.com Leading Technology, Science, Agriculture News and information	Part of the Identityscape.com network... getxfactor.com jmoodmusic.com smartbusinesschoices.com mintdepot.com lowfaresalways.com evangelicalview.com shoppingpodder.com soproudlywehail.com webnews.ws currenthumor.com

Science and Technology news... Forum Index -> Cognitive Science Forum	Goto page Previous 1, 2, 3
Page 3 of 3