Mike
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 Posted: Sat Oct 04, 2003 10:45 pm Post subject: Essay on Method 2 |
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Lester,
going back to the communication problem: viewing thought as behaviour can
explain why there might be thinking without language:
a person transforms his/her intentions (emotions) into actions, observes the
results (gets a feed-back), reflects on them and goes for another series of
actions.
This cycle is considered to be a thinking cycle and CAN be performed without
use of a language while riping intentions and reflecting on the results.
S/he can use visual images to handle this part of the process.
Usually artists and so called 'technically minded' people claim they cannot
explain in words what and why they are doing, though their behaviour
displays intelligence.
Is this close to what you meant by '...In other words I think it is going to
be very difficult to solve the
cognitive problem in the human mind - if you will - without also
addressing the similar but not identical problems in animals and
plants and doing so via the same basic mechanism.'?
Mike |
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Lester Zick
Guest
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| Posted: Sun Oct 05, 2003 9:04 pm Post subject: Re: Essay on Method 2 |
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On Sat, 04 Oct 2003 17:45:05 GMT, "Mike" <chumakin@rogers.com> in
sci.cognitive wrote:
[quote]Lester,
going back to the communication problem: viewing thought as behaviour can
explain why there might be thinking without language:
a person transforms his/her intentions (emotions) into actions, observes the
results (gets a feed-back), reflects on them and goes for another series of
actions.
This cycle is considered to be a thinking cycle and CAN be performed without
use of a language while riping intentions and reflecting on the results.
S/he can use visual images to handle this part of the process.
Usually artists and so called 'technically minded' people claim they cannot
explain in words what and why they are doing, though their behaviour
displays intelligence.
Is this close to what you meant by '...In other words I think it is going to
be very difficult to solve the
cognitive problem in the human mind - if you will - without also
addressing the similar but not identical problems in animals and
plants and doing so via the same basic mechanism.'?
Mike
[/quote]
Hi Mike,
This is the general idea. We have different kinds of behavior in
plants, animals, and humans yet they all have elements in common. And
I consider that postulating three or more categorically different but
coincidental mechanisms to explain the behavior in each stretches the
bounds of credulity.
The way I look at it we>re faced with having to explain at least the
three types of behavior on some common mechanical foundation.
Otherwise we>re faced with having to explain how three or more
different mechanisms arose to interact in purely coincidental terms.
Let me see if I can give an example. Many people are working on
modeling various aspects of human cognition with varying degrees of
success - many or most with turing algorithms. However if we then ask
whether the same mechanics and the same model underlie comparable
aspects of cognition - or cognitive behavior if you will - in animals,
I think the answer would have to be puzzlement or pleas of ignorance.
In other words I don>t think anybody approaches the problem from this
perspective except perhaps behaviorists. And they only approach it in
this direction that I know of to explain the similarities and not the
differences between animal cognitive behavior and human cognition. And
certainly no one that I know of does this with respect to plants.
Now I don>t mind calling human cognition and animal cognition behavior
because that>s really what it is: cognitive behavior. And I don>t
think that using the term behavior prejudices the case one way or the
other as long as we do not necessarily try to read into the term
behaviorist connotations and technical considerations - because that>s
a whole different kettle of fish that I>m not trying to argue one way
or the other at the moment.
What matters is the kind of behavior we>re dealing with in terms of
cognition and then the kinds of cognition we>re dealing with in terms
of animal cognition on the one hand and human cognition on the other.
There are those who consider them sufficiently close to be identical
for analytical purposes. However I do not and I consider that attempts
to explain either have to first take into account and reconcile the
differences between them.
Now as to the first point you raise with respect to the use of
language as a basic determinant of human cognition. What matters is
not so much whether language is used but whether it can be and applies
to the kind of cognitive behavior we>re trying to analyze. Many people
claim to be unable to explain what they are doing or how and why. But
even that ignorance is indicative of the abstract nature of their
cognitive process.
An animal would not even be able to consider the problem. It>s not so
much an issue of ignorance but of capability. If a person is ignorant
of certain cognitive circumstances he knows he is ignorant and that
the ignorance is expressible in words whether or not knowledge of
those cognitive circumstances is.
If a person were truly ignorant of such circumstances in categorical
terms the way an animal is, he could not even consider the issue, and
the question of ignorance or knowledge would never arise. This is what
marks the issue of cognition in humans as categorically distinct from
that in animals despite the similarities between various kinds of
behavior in each. And this is the reason I consider the use and
capacity to use language to describe cognitive circumstances of
fundamental significance to a recognition of the differences between
cognitive behavior in each.
There is something about our ability to describe what we think in
relation to other things we think that reflects some basic
characteristic of the mechanical terms in which we think. And that
characteristic is either completely absent or nearly so in the case of
animal cognition. And this remains true whether or not we are able to
explain what we think in words and language in individual instances.
There are certainly cognitive circumstances in human cognition which
we cannot explain in words and language and which are analogous to
similar circumstances in animal cognitive behavior. I>m thinking of
things like sensory stimulation or the decision to move an arm or a
leg. These kinds of things we can ultimately explain in mechanical
terms but only after the fact because the fact is that we don>t and
can>t know what actually motivates that kind of behavior in real time
coincident with the action.
But the ability to consider and know what we think under a variety of
conditions distinguishes the nature of cognitive behavior in human
beings from that in animals. And we need to explain the origin and
nature of that capability not only in terms of animal cogntive
behavior but also in terms of those differences indicated by the
anomalous use of language to describe our thoughts in relation to one
another.
Regards - Lester |
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